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Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures’ managers 
 
Abstract 
 The general management literature has long focused on the agency risks involved in the 
relationship between general managers and shareholders. Shareholders can deploy contractual 
and non-contractual mechanisms to reduce these inefficiencies. This study examines - based on a 
broad international sample of investment contracts - how the use of contractual and non-
contractual mechanisms is related to the degree of risks associated with the venture’s 
development stage as well as how these practices differ across countries. Hypotheses are tested 
using a proprietary dataset of 265 hand-collected investment contracts associated with ventures 
in the U.S., Israel and nine European countries. Findings suggest that the use of mitigating 
contractual and non-contractual mechanisms is related to the degree of agency risks, and that 
these practices vary across countries. This study draws implications for how investors can best 
deploy their capital in different institutional settings whilst nurturing their relationships with 
managers and entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction 
The debate over whether managers' actions are consonant with the interests of shareholders 
has a long history in the general management literature (Oviatt, 1988). The relationship between 
agents (i.e. managers-entrepreneurs) and principals (i.e. shareholders-investors) has been the 
focus of a large stream of the general management literature (e.g. Martin, Wiseman, and Gomez-
Mejia, 2016). Management scholars have demonstrated that the relationship between agents and 
principals is endangered by agency risks, i.e. the likelihood of the emergence of contractual 
inefficiencies. These risks generally arise in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard and 
are exacerbated by technological shifts, fast-moving industries and new ventures (Abdallah, 
Darayseh, and Waples, 2013; Burchardt, et al., 2016). In order to mitigate them, principals have 
different mechanisms available: (1) pre-investment screening and due diligence that allows 
investors to select the best managers and ventures (Manigart et al., 2006); (2) contracts that align 
the incentives of the managers with those of the investors, and at the same time reduce downside 
losses (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003); (3) post-investment monitoring and control rights that 
allow shareholders to steer the company strategy in the right direction and regain control if 
necessary (Hellman and Puri, 2002; Martin et al., 2016).  
Although the general management literature has come a long way since the seminal 
articles of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Williamson (1985), evidence on the effectiveness of 
contractual and non-contractual mechanisms in controlling agency risks “has been mixed at best” 
(Martin et al., 2016: 1). Despite extensive progress, the current general management literature 
offers some interesting research gaps. First, past work on this subject has been descriptive (e.g. 
Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003, 2004; Burchardt et al., 2016), has 
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considered the mechanisms in isolation (e.g. Hellmann and Puri, 2002; Martin et al., 2016), or 
has focused on mature-listed companies (e.g. Tosi, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia, 1997). Second, we 
still lack insight on when contractual and non-contractual mechanisms are utilized to manage the 
relationship agent-principal in unlisted companies. Third, despite the increasingly globalized 
nature of the economic environment, there is limited research on how institutions affect 
relationships between managers-entrepreneurs and shareholders-investors across national 
boundaries.  
The aim of this paper is to fill these three gaps in the following way. First, this paper 
investigates when - i.e. under which conditions - contractual (e.g. cash flow rights) and non-
contractual (e.g. monitoring) mechanisms are implemented by shareholders-investors (principals) 
in unlisted companies which are still in the early stage of their development (typically labelled as 
seed, start-up and expansion phases). Second, the richness of the contractual data allows the 
consideration of the interaction of several mechanisms in the mitigation of agency risk, which is 
particularly prevalent in new ventures. Third, this study is one of the first to investigate how the 
institutional context is affecting the adoption of such mechanisms. The paper tests its hypotheses 
on a unique dataset of hand-collected confidential investment contracts involving firms in the 
U.S., various countries in Europe and Israel. This proprietary dataset includes 265 investments of 
venture capital (VC) firms in 127 ventures. The industry context is appropriate for this study due 
to its fast-moving nature, high uncertainty and severe agency risks (Wright and Lockett, 2003).  
This paper contributes to the general management literature by enhancing our understanding 
of how principals (shareholders-investors) can better manage their relationship with agents 
(managers-entrepreneurs) and reduce potential agency conflicts. Considering how difficult it is 
for investors in these contexts to assess the quality of a company ex-ante and measure the agent 
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(manager-entrepreneur) effort ex-post, it is important to explore how investment risks can be 
reduced with contractual and non-contractual mechanisms. The findings have naturally broader 
relevance for the classic shareholder-manager relationship that is notoriously endangered by 
agency risks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The study argues theoretically, and 
demonstrates empirically, that investments are designed to consider the riskiness of the ventures 
and the agency risks involved in the relationship between managers-entrepreneurs and investors-
shareholders. It further demonstrates that investing practices, contractual and non-contractual, 
differ depending on the level and type of agency risk associated with the investment, and 
depending on the institutional context.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we derive a set of 
hypotheses characterizing the relation between principals (investors-shareholders) and agents 
(managers-entrepreneurs). This is followed by an overview of the data used to test the 
hypotheses, a description of the empirical methodology and a discussion of the main results. The 
final section concludes and outlines future research opportunities as well as managerial 
implications. 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
Agency risks endanger financing relationships where there is a principal (investor-
shareholder) and an agent (manager-entrepreneur). These risks are particularly relevant in the 
funding of new ventures. The interaction between founders-managers and shareholders-investors 
gives rise to principal-agent conflicts because of high investment uncertainty, information 
asymmetry, and behavioral incentive problems. Investors (as principals) invest capital into high-
risk ventures managed by entrepreneurs (the agents) that possess considerably more information 
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about their venture. This leads to agency risks resulting from adverse selection and moral hazard. 
To protect their investment returns, principals need to reduce agency risks. 
Adverse selection arises from the principal’s difficulty to evaluate the quality of the 
investment (which includes the agent’s abilities). In certain cases, products may experience an 
initial traction that then fades quickly. In other cases, ventures aim to develop new technologies 
that are difficult to assess, and whose market is unidentified. In general, the earlier the stage of a 
company development, the harder it is to evaluate the quality of the venture. Investors mitigate 
these problems by conducting detailed due diligence and ensuring that they hire executives with 
ample industry experience. Pre-investment screening can be strengthened with syndication (i.e. 
involving more investors expands the resources and skills available to evaluate a venture) and by 
looking at signals emanating from the target such as the founders’ acceptance of certain 
contractual clauses (e.g. Lerner, 1994). Relevant signals convey the entrepreneurs’ confidence of 
the quality of their venture or business plan (Amit, et al., 1990; Tykvova, 2007).  
Investors are also at risk of managers-entrepreneurs’ moral hazard. Even when investors 
choose good projects, the manager and entrepreneur might still behave opportunistically and 
diminish the value of the investors’ payout (e.g. using company resources for his/her own 
benefits). Investors can mitigate the moral hazard problem in several ways by, for example, 
negotiating control rights such as board rights and management replacement rights through 
which they can check the venture’s progress and the founder’s behavior. However, some features 
of the entrepreneur’s business will remain unobservable or unverifiable. Agency risks can be 
reduced by negotiating cash flow rights such as preferred equity, redemptions rights, tag along 
clauses as well as staged financing. Cash flow rights can impose severe penalties on the 
entrepreneur for opportunistic behavior and guarantee investors a better protection in case of 
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bankruptcy. The entrepreneur’s acceptance of these clauses is, per se, a strong signal of 
confidence and acts as deterrent for opportunism.  
Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model. Early-stage ventures are mostly endangered 
by adverse selection risks, which implies a greater reliance on cash flow rights. In contrast, later-
stage ventures are more likely to suffer from moral hazard risks, to be addressed with a broader 
use of control rights. Further, institutional logics play an important role in the use of these 
mechanisms. The expectation is that more developed funding markets such as the U.S. will 
implement more screening, monitoring and cash flow rights, but fewer control rights. In the next 
sections, these mechanisms are explained in detail. 
---------- Insert Figure 1 about here ---------- 
2.1 Ventures’ agency risks 
Some investments carry more agency risks than others. In the VC industry, adverse 
selection is usually associated with the level of development of the venture. Early-stage ventures 
are more uncertain and, consequently, carry substantial adverse selection risks. As Podolny 
(2001) writes, entrepreneurial firms that have not yet developed a viable product are regarded as 
being in the first (early) stage. Second-stage financing takes place after a company has initiated 
production but typically before the company has become profitable. Finally, when the company 
enters the third (late) stage it usually has already built up a substantial revenue stream and might 
start to show positive profitability. As the company progresses through the various stages, 
adverse selection risks and information asymmetries surrounding the firm can be expected to 
diminish.  
On the contrary, the potential for moral hazard increases with venture development. The 
potential misallocation of effort by the founder, who has an incentive to accumulate private 
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benefits at the expense of investors, is likely to increase as the venture develops and the 
founder’s equity share shrinks. Venture growth is accompanied by entrepreneurs having more 
resources under their control (but with a smaller share of total equity) and increasing confidence 
(as they obtain superior information on the firm’s substance and prospects). Moral hazard risks 
also stem from potentially diverging interests that worsen over time between investors and 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs will, for instance, increasingly associate non-monetary benefits 
with their role in the company (Bergemann and Hege, 1998). 
In sum, early-stage ventures are exposed to higher adverse selection risks and lower 
moral hazard risks. On the other hand, moral hazard is more prominent in later-stage ventures. 
Venture capitalists have several contractual and non-contractual levers to maximize their returns 
and manage their risks when they invest in ventures at different stages.  
2.2 Syndication as a screening and monitoring mechanism 
Syndication refers to equity investments by multiple investors under conditions of 
uncertainty that will result in joint-payoffs. It is a pre-investment screening and post-investment 
monitoring mechanism (e.g. Lerner, 1994; Manigart et al., 2006). Having multiple syndicate 
partners involved, allows for better due diligence and monitoring because of cumulated resources 
and skills (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986).  
However, syndication is not without cost. First, co-investors not only share the burden of 
due diligence, but they also share the potential rewards. By co-investing, each VC obtains a 
lower amount of equity (and risk) and therefore a smaller portion of the potential exit proceeds. 
Second, previous research has highlighted that syndicates face risks of opportunism and conflicts 
between co-investors (Bellavitis et al., 2017b). As Filatotchev, Wright and Arberk (2006) 
explain, syndicate members may behave opportunistically with each other, leading to the so 
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called “principal-principal” agency risk. Therefore, syndication needs to be implemented 
conservatively. 
Considering the benefits and costs, syndication is more likely to be implemented in early-
stage ventures. Syndication is particularly useful for reducing information asymmetries and 
facilitating a more thorough due diligence during the early stages of the venture development 
cycle. In this phase, company-specific risks and information asymmetries are high. Combining 
the expertise of multiple investors can help disentangle risks and prospects of ventures, and 
thereby improve the chances of investment success (Lerner, 1994). The value of additional 
opinions increases in parallel with the perceived degree of information asymmetries and adverse 
selection (Cumming, 2006). Further, the moral hazard risks of later-stage ventures, coupled with 
the risks embedded in the principal-principal relationship, may reinforce each other. These 
negative effects might be exacerbated by increased monetary stakes associated with later-stage 
ventures. It is therefore in the early stages of a venture’s development that syndication as a 
screening and monitoring mechanism can outweigh its costs. The first hypothesis follows.  
Hypothesis 1: A higher degree of syndication is more likely to be associated with early-
stage ventures. 
2.3 Financial contracts and staged financing as signals  
The second way for investors to reduce investment and agency risks is to design 
incentive-optimal investment contracts. Numerous management studies have shown that 
contracts shape the principal-agent relationship (e.g. Tosi et al., 1997). In the VC industry, the 
most commonly used contractually negotiated financial rights are preferred equity, redemption 
rights, tag-along rights and staged financing. These rights grant investors the possibility to 
protect their investments at the expense of the entrepreneur. For example, preferred equity is a 
 10 
higher-ranking financing instrument that raises the de-facto seniority of the investors’ equity 
(above the entrepreneur’s common equity) by securing increased dividends and liquidation rights 
in the event of poor performance or bankruptcy. An additional but related mechanism is staged 
financing, which involves the contingent release of investment funds depending on whether 
certain milestones are being met by the company. Several authors have studied the role of staged 
financing in reducing uncertainty (e.g. Wang and Zhou, 2004). 
Negotiating cash flow rights and staged financing into investment contracts provides 
three main advantages to funding providers. First, the yielding of cash flow rights to investors is 
a signal of quality, which help to deal with adverse selection and information asymmetries. 
When entrepreneurs are willing to accept an incentive structure that punishes poor performance, 
they signal confidence in their ability and their business plan (Hall and Woodward, 2010). 
Similarly, if the entrepreneur-manager accepts a financing structure split into different tranches, 
he/she signals confidence of achieving contractual milestones.  Second, cash flow rights and 
staged financing reduce potential losses that an investor can incur, especially in risky early-stage 
ventures. For example, in the case of liquidation, investors holding preferred equity (rather than 
common equity) are likely to recoup a larger part of their investment.  
However, like in any negotiation, investors need to “pay” these cash flow rights, e.g. by 
accepting a higher initial valuation, by giving up alternative rights, or by simply straining the 
relationship with the founder with uncertain later penalties. The investors’ chances for venture 
success decrease when entrepreneurs feel that they are treated unfairly implying that leniency in 
contractual bargaining can help to avoid conflicts down the line (Busenitz, et al., 2004).  
Therefore, these mechanisms should only be demanded when they are at their most useful and 
the protection is most needed.  
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Cash flow rights and staged financing are particularly useful during the early stages of a 
venture’s development cycle. In this phase, company-specific risks and information asymmetries 
are high; therefore, investors need to rely on signals to evaluate the company prospects and on 
contractual hedges to limit their financial risk. Early-stage ventures face a higher risk of failure 
and so the protection benefits warrantied by cash flow rights might offer investors an important 
layer of protection in case of liquidation. It is in the early stages of company development that 
cash flow rights and staged financing are most useful. Therefore, we expect broader use of cash 
flow rights and staged financing in the early stage, and a more conservative use in the later stage.  
Hypothesis 2a: A higher degree of cash flow rights is more likely to be associated with 
early-stage ventures. 
Hypothesis 2b: Staged financing is more likely to be associated with early-stage 
ventures. 
2.4 Control rights as a monitoring mechanism 
Investors can also reduce agency risks, especially moral hazard, by demanding board 
control and management replacement rights. They provide the ability of influencing the 
company’s strategic direction and, in extreme cases, entitle the investors to replace the 
founder/CEO (Hellman and Puri, 2002). Control rights help to enforce cooperative behavior by 
the entrepreneur. In case of poor venture performance, board control would gradually shift 
towards investors (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) and management would eventually be fully 
replaced (Hellman and Puri, 2002). 
Negotiating board majority and management replacement rights into investment contracts 
provides investors with two main advantages. First, the founder’s willingness to give up control 
through board majority is again a signal of quality and represents a commitment to non-
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opportunistic behavior. Second, investors gain the right to intervene in case the start-up’s 
prospects or the relationship with the founder deteriorates unexpectedly. As before, negotiating 
board majority and management replacement rights can strain the relationship with the founder 
and may be perceived as a lack of trust and a challenge of the founder’s integrity and 
competence. This can have a detrimental effect on future interactions between the contracting 
parties, with consequent lower chances of venture’s success, and should therefore be used 
cautiously.  
Board majority and management replacement rights are more appropriate for later-stage 
ventures. The divergence of interests between entrepreneur and investors increases with the 
maturity of the venture, which invites moral hazard behavior and not just because of the dilution 
of the entrepreneur’s equity-holding. While early-stage funding decisions are strongly influenced 
by the founders’ qualities and acumen, the prospects of later-stage firms are becoming 
increasingly detached from their founders. The next two hypotheses follow. 
Hypothesis 3a: Board majority is more likely to be associated with later-stage ventures. 
Hypothesis 3b: A management replacement clause is more likely to be associated with 
later-stage ventures. 
2.5 Agency reduction mechanisms in different institutional settings 
 Whilst agency risks account for why certain characteristics of transacting parties can be 
related to specific mitigating mechanisms, they do not account for institutional differences in 
terms of (a) perceived agency risks and (b) contractual practices. Institutional differences arise 
from institutional arrangements that include rules, regulations, norms, values, and taken-for-
granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate behavior (Scott, 2007). VC institutions 
around the world significantly differ in their level of maturity. The VC industry started in the 
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U.S. and then gradually expanded to Europe, Israel and, more recently, developing countries 
such as China. The level of sophistication of the VC industry depends on the learning stage of 
each country (e.g. Cumming, 2008).  
The U.S. VC industry is considered the most mature and most sophisticated. It is where 
the professionalization of the VC industry started, setting up the norms and nuances defining the 
behavior of VC managers and firms. These practices later diffused to the rest of the world, 
starting with Europe (e.g. Bruton et al., 2005, 2009). Hence, going by a temporal assessment of 
the VC industry’s development, the U.S. VC industry is the most developed and sophisticated in 
the management of their investments including the use mechanisms such as syndication, cash 
flow rights and staged financing.  
Hypothesis 4a: Syndication, cash flow rights and staged financing are more likely to be 
implemented by U.S. investors. 
Sophistication is not the only difference between the U.S. VC market and the rest of the 
world. It is well known that the attitude towards failure is considerably more lenient and 
forgiving in the U.S. than in other countries (e.g. Europe). Burchell and Hughes (2006), 
surveying individuals from 19 countries (including the U.S. and numerous European countries), 
found that U.S. individuals are the most tolerant towards failure. This feature is a cornerstone of 
the entrepreneurial successes in Silicon Valley, and the U.S. entrepreneurial ecosystem at large 
(Cardon and McGrath, 1999; Sarasvathy et al., 2013; Shepherd, 2003). Hence, it is expected that 
U.S. investors negotiate a lower amount of control rights and management replacement rights, 
compared to their non-U.S. peers.  
Hypothesis 4b: Control rights and management replacement rights are less likely to be 
negotiated by U.S. investors. 
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3. Methods 
3.1 Dataset and data collection 
 Our dataset consists of hand-collected details on international VC financing contracts for a 
sample of 265 investments in 127 portfolio companies by 90 different lead VCs in the United 
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Israel, France, Scandinavia and other European countries. 
The analyzed investments took place between 1997 and 2008. To collect the data, several VC 
partnerships have been approached through a snowball sampling and asked to provide their 
original investment contracts. “The [snowball sampling] method is well suited […] when the 
focus of study is on a sensitive issue, possibly concerning a relatively private matter” (Biernacki 
and Waldorf, 1981: 141). In the VC industry, investment contracts are highly sensitive and 
confidential, and personal introductions are of the essence. Snowball sampling was the most 
appropriate method to access investment documents. Non-random sampling has been 
implemented in similar studies (Ljungqvist and Richardson, 2003; Wry, Lounsbury and 
Jennings, 2014). Accounting for the industry’s high confidentiality standards, all contracts were 
accessed in the VCs’ headquarters, and all data was encoded anonymously. The sample included 
both small and large VCs and those with a national and/or international investment focus. To 
ensure the representativeness of the sample, a comparison study with other published articles has 
been conducted (see Appendix for more details). 
Overall, the dataset has several advantages over most others used in previous studies in 
the field. First, data collection by hand eliminates the typical biases of survey research, implying 
high data quality and more factual detail. Second, the information accessed in the described form 
is extraordinarily comprehensive and goes beyond what was generally analyzed in previous VC 
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studies.
1
 Third, this study is the first to access this kind of in-depth information across some of 
the largest VC markets in world. Primary data collection is, however, not without limitations and 
these will be discussed in detail in the limitations section. 
3.2 Measures 
3.2.1 Independent variables 
Agency risks. Podolny (2001) suggests that the degree of agency risks is a function of the 
venture’s development stage at the time of the investment. He argues that adverse selection is 
most prevalent in early-stage ventures, and moral hazard is most severe in later-stage ventures. 
Two dummy variables are included in the analyses to capture this effect: One for early-stage 
ventures, and one for later-stage ventures, keeping the intermediate stage as the base model. 
Institutional setting. To test hypotheses 4a and 4b, two dummy variables related to the country 
where the investment is carried out are included: U.S. and Israel. Therefore, the base model 
captures investments in Europe. 
3.2.2 Control variables 
Considering the relatively low number of total observations, we applied a conservative approach 
for the inclusion of control variables to avoid model overestimation. Four control variables are 
included in the analyses.
2
 First, it would be problematic to include dummy variables for each 
year; therefore, models include a Dotcom bubble measure that takes the value of 1 when the 
                                                 
1
 The scope of the examined documents exceeds that of most other studies. For example, Cumming (2008) limit his 
analyses to investment agreements, while Lerner and Schoar (2005) analyze only investment agreements, investment 
memoranda and business plans. This data is most similar in scope to work by  aplan and  tr omberg (    ) and 
Kaplan et al. (2007).  
2
 We tested a fifth control variable (Round number, a count of how many VC investment rounds the entrepreneurial 
firm received before the focal one), but are not reporting the results because of collinearity issues. The inclusion of 
this variable does not change the results. 
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investment was carried out during the peak of the internet bubble (1999-2000). The analysis 
controls for investment size (in ‘   ) as a motive for syndication (Investment per VC) and for the 
equity stake controlled by the investor (VC stake). Finally, investments in biotech or medical 
ventures might require different investment practices compared to, for example, software firms. 
Hence, an industry Life science dummy variable is included.  
3.2.3 Dependent variables 
 Each hypothesis involves a different outcome variable. As pointed out by Tosi et al. 
(1997), it is important to consider agency reduction mechanisms in conjunction as investors will 
consider their use jointly rather than in isolation. Therefore, dependent variables change 
throughout the different models and, when the dependent variables rotate, they are used as 
control variables.  
Syndication. This variable captures the degree of syndication. It is a count variable denoting the 
number of VC investors involved in the deal. 
Cash flow rights. Cash flow rights is a count measure that considers how many cash flow rights 
are incorporated into an investment contract. Three types of cash flow rights are considered: 
Preferred equity, redemption rights and tag along rights. This measure can take values from 0 to 
3 depending on how many types of cash flow rights are granted to the investors.  
Staged financing. The measure is coded 1 when the investment is staged (i.e. when the investors 
disburse their funds in stages according to predetermined milestones) and 0 when the funding is 
provided as one bullet transfer.  
Control rights. Two main mechanisms are included: Board majority and Management 
replacement rights. The former measure captures whether VCs control the majority of board 
voting rights, which enables them to enforce certain actions by the entrepreneur or to influence 
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important operational and strategic decisions. This variable takes the value of 1 in case VCs have 
board majority, 0 otherwise. The management replacement measure equals 1 if an explicit 
management replacement clause in favor of the investor is included in the contract, and 0 
otherwise. With this clause, VCs have the option of replacing venture management with directors 
of their choice. This clause can be triggered upon certain conditions being met, usually 
associated with poor firm performance. 
3.3 Statistical models 
The analysis utilizes five different dependent variables and, in each case, the estimation 
technique is tailored around the choice of variable. Models 1 and 2 use a Poisson regression (see 
Coleman, 1964: 378–379) to test Hypotheses 1 and 2a. As reported by Stata, “a Poisson 
regression fits models of the number of occurrences (counts)”, and is therefore appropriate for 
the variable of syndication (count of VCs involved, model 1) and cash flow rights (count of cash 
flow rights, model 2). Models 3 through 5 use a Logistic (logit) regression (see Aldrich and 
Nelson, 1984) to test Hypotheses 2b, 3a, 3b, 4a, and 4b. As reported by  tata, “Logit fits 
maximum likelihood models with dichotomous dependent variables coded as  /1”. The 
dependent variables staged financing, board rights majority and management replacement are 
dummy variables (coded as 0/1). In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the individual 
VC firm level, which allows us to consider the potential of within-group correlation of errors 
(VC firm). 
3.4 Results 
Table 1 reports the basic descriptive statistics and correlations for both, the dependent 
and independent variables. Around 38% of the ventures are in early stage, 20% in later-stage, 
with the remainder in intermediate stage. Approximately 24% of the ventures are U.S. based and 
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24% operate in the life science industry. The average investment per VC is $2.2M for a post-
investment equity stake of 59.3% controlled by 3.7 investors. 9% of the investment contracts 
incorporate an explicit management replacement clause and around 58% of investments are 
managed through a board rights majority. Staged financing is also widespread, with 48% of the 
investments being disbursed over time.  
---------- Insert Table 1 about here ---------- 
Correlations show early stage investments are usually in the life science industry during 
the dotcom bubble. Interestingly, the dotcom bubble variable is negatively correlated with four 
out of five mechanisms showing that, during this period, VCs were less demanding. In terms of 
geographical distribution, Israel and the U.S. are negatively correlated with early-stage 
investments, but positively correlated with later-stage investments. Also, the dummy variable 
U.S. is positively correlated with the VC stake as well as with the use of various mechanisms 
such as syndication or cash flow rights, but negatively correlated with management replacement 
clauses. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all within the acceptable range and significantly 
below the critical level of 10. Hence, the findings are robust to multicollinearity concerns.  
Table 2 presents the regression results, which represent a detailed assessment of the 
contractual and non-contractual mechanisms that VC firms use in major VC markets. Regression 
estimates show how the utilization of these mechanisms varies with the development stage and 
the location of the venture. As discussed, the dependent variable (DV) is different for every 
model.  
---------- Insert Table 2 about here ---------- 
Model 1 tests hypothesis 1 and therefore the dependent variable is syndication - the 
number of VCs involved in the deal. Hypothesis 1 proposes that in the early stages of the 
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venture’s development, there will be a broader use of syndication than in intermediate or later 
stages. Results show that there is no significant difference between early and intermediate (base 
model) stages in terms of the degree of syndication. However, VC firms investing in later-stage 
ventures rely significantly less on syndication. Hence, there is support for hypothesis 1. 
Model 2 tests hypothesis 2a, and consequently the dependent variable is the number of 
cash flow rights in favor of the VC investors. It is hypothesized that in the early stages of the 
venture’s development, VCs will negotiate more cash flow rights than in the later or intermediate 
stages. Empirics confirm this. Hence, results lend support to hypothesis 2a. 
Model 3 tests hypothesis 2b, and therefore the dependent variable is staged financing. It 
is hypothesized that in the early stages of the venture’s development, there will be broader use of 
staged financing than in the later stages. Contrary to expectations, VCs adopt staged financing 
significantly less often in the early stages than in the subsequent stages (intermediate and later 
stages). This finding might be explained by the fact that in the early stages it is more difficult to 
specify precise milestones upon which to link additional financing. Hence, results do not lend 
support to hypothesis 2b. 
Model 4 tests hypothesis 3a, and therefore the dependent variable is board rights 
majority. It is hypothesized that in the early stages of the venture’s development, VCs will 
negotiate less voting rights than in the later stages. In line with expectations, VCs obtain the 
majority of board rights significantly more often in later stages than in the early stages (p < .1). 
Hence, hypothesis 3a is supported. 
Model 5 tests hypothesis 3b, and therefore the dependent variable is management 
replacement. It is hypothesized that there will be rarer use of management replacement clauses in 
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the early stages of a venture’s development than in the later stages. Results are not statistically 
significant.  
To test hypotheses 4a and 4b, location dummies (i.e. U.S. and Israel) are added. It was 
expected that U.S. investors use syndication, cash flow rights and staged financing more broadly 
than non-U.S. investors (i.e. European and Israeli), but utilize majority board voting rights and 
management replacement clauses less frequently. Results show broad support for both 
hypotheses. U.S. VCs syndicate their deals significantly more than their European and Israeli 
counterparts (model 1). Results also show that U.S. (and Israeli) VCs obtain more cash flow 
rights than European VCs (model 2). However, analyses do not show any statistically significant 
differences across countries with regards to staged financing (model 3). In relation to hypothesis 
4b, in line with our predictions, U.S. VC investors obtain the majority of board rights (model 4) 
and management replacement clauses (model 5) less often when compared to European and 
Israeli VCs. Hence, results lend broad support to hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
4. Discussion 
This paper sheds light on how principals (investors), through contractual and non-
contractual mechanisms, mitigate investment risks, especially the ones related to agency risks. 
Investors face difficulties related to understanding the venture’s quality (i.e. adverse selection) 
and managing the managers-founders’ effort (i.e. moral hazard). In this paper, the extent of 
principal-agent conflict embedded in the investors-entrepreneurs relationship is modelled as a 
function of the degree of information asymmetry and incentive problems faced by investors at 
each investment stage. As suggested by Podolny (2001), the earlier the investment stage, the 
higher the adverse selection, information asymmetries, and failure risks faced by the investors. 
The later the investment stage, the stronger the agent’s incentive to behave opportunistically. 
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By associating the risks embedded in each investment to contractual and non-contractual 
practices, our research sheds light on the potential mechanisms that govern investment practices. 
The paper investigates under which conditions, namely different venture development stages and 
different agency risks, contractual (cash flow rights, board rights, staged financing, management 
replacement rights) and non-contractual mechanisms (syndication) are implemented by financial 
investors. It is argued that these mechanisms are costly and need to be chosen parsimoniously 
(Manigart et al., 2006). Investors are better off negotiating these mechanisms when they are most 
beneficial, depending on the type and degree of agency risks surrounding their investment. 
In line with the theoretical predictions, results show that VCs investing in firms with 
higher agency risks broadly implement contractual and non-contractual mechanisms to better 
select their investee companies, monitor them post-investment, and protect themselves in case of 
poor performance and opportunistic behavior by the venture’s management. In early-stage firms 
(as opposed to later stage firms) where adverse selection and failure risks are higher, results 
show a widespread use of syndication as a screening and monitoring tool and of cash flow rights 
(e.g. preferred equity) as a signaling and protection mechanism. On the other hand, in later stage 
firms where moral hazard risks are higher, investors negotiate more control rights (e.g. board 
majority rights) as a monitoring and influence mechanism.  
This paper also examined the prevalence of cash flow rights such as preferred equity, 
redemption rights and tag-along clauses as both signaling and protection mechanisms. Findings 
are in line with previous studies (e.g. Trester, 1998) that showed that cash flow rights are a 
mechanism to mitigate adverse selection (through signals) broadly associated with the perceived 
degree of venture selection risk (Gompers, 1995). This important finding confirms that investors 
mitigate risks by calling on the entrepreneurs’ willingness to accept an incentive structure that 
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financially punishes them in the event of poor performance. This is a strong signal of the quality 
of the venture itself (Hall and Woodward, 2010). Cash flow rights also offer protection against 
financial losses and are used to mitigate the investment risks of early stage ventures.  
Interestingly, contrary to expectations, investors in early-stage ventures are less likely to 
employ staged financing. This finding can be explained by the fact that during the early stages of 
venture development, it is difficult to set precise milestones for subsequent fund releases. VCs 
usually invest in an idea and a founder. Future work could explore this phenomenon in greater 
detail. 
In addition, the paper sheds light on how investment practices differ across countries. This 
research compares U.S. investors with their international competitors. On the one hand, results 
show that the superior level of sophistication of U.S. investors encourages them to syndicate 
more often, and contractually negotiate more cash flow rights. On the other hand, it shows that 
U.S. investors are less likely to negotiate control mechanisms such as board rights and 
management replacement clauses. These results might be driven by a more failure-forgiving 
culture. This logic is consistent with the existing literature arguing that acceptance of failure is a 
key driver of entrepreneurship (e.g. Cardon and McGrath, 1999) and that U.S. investors place a 
comparatively stronger emphasis on the founders’ qualities (Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg, 
2009). These results answer calls for research to study agency risks in international settings 
(Bellavitis, Filatotchev, Kamuriwo, and Vanacker, 2017a) 
5. Limitations and future research 
This paper has several limitations that present opportunities for future research. First, 
although the dataset is unique and offers a rich set of information, it presents its own challenges. 
The main limitation is the snowball sampling technique, which could have led to biases. The 
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authors meticulously tried to receive responses from a wide number of investors, and the variety 
of the respondents and investment rounds is testimony to this. However, results need to be taken 
with care considering that the sample might not be fully representative of the global VC industry. 
Unfortunately, this is a limitation shared by most qualitative databases (e.g. Bellavitis, 
Kamuriwo and Hommel, forthcoming). Further, receiving legal documents from extremely 
secretive parties such as VCs is very difficult. The authors feel fortunate regarding the number of 
responses received and the depth of case-level data extracted from the documents. It comes with 
the downside that the number of observations is limited. Future work should therefore test the 
hypotheses with different data sources and larger samples.  
Further, this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship associated with investors and 
managers-entrepreneurs. It would be interesting to see whether these findings extend to other 
contexts such as bankers and borrowers. Finally, forthcoming work could investigate whether 
similar dynamics apply to other types of relationships relevant to general management 
researchers. For example, do these findings extend to managers of large corporations? Does it 
make sense for shareholders to include certain contractual rights (e.g. replacement rights) into 
CEO contracts? Do institutional logics play a role, for example in emerging markets? These are 
just a few examples of follow-up work that could be inspired by this paper. 
6. Managerial implications 
The results presented in this paper offer significant managerial implications that go beyond the 
funding of new ventures by financial investors. Similar dynamics could be extended, for 
example, to shareholders and general managers of newly listed companies. Both investors and 
managers should understand the information asymmetries involved in their relationship. 
Managers need to be aware that principals face obstacles in evaluating their effort. Along these 
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lines, they need to accept that principals might implement mechanisms such as monitoring or 
demand contractual rights. Principals need to be aware that managers are emotionally attached to 
their company and that intense negotiations might be detrimental for the principal-agent 
relationship, especially in institutional settings that are not supportive of those mechanisms. 
During the negotiation phase, principals need to consider the potential benefits and costs 
associated with mechanisms that aim to reduce agency risks involved in the relationship between 
agents and principals. These mechanisms can be valuable, but are not without costs. For 
example, attaching too many financial benefits to performance-related bonuses might lead 
managers to feel that shareholders do not trust them and incentivize managers to act with a short-
term perspective.  
7. Conclusions 
The general management literature has long identified agency risks involved in the relationship 
between general managers and shareholders. We investigate contractual and non-contractual 
mechanisms that VC shareholders can utilize to reduce these conflicts. The main insight from 
this study is that mitigating mechanisms such as syndication, cash flow rights and contractual 
rights offer both advantages and disadvantages. We show that shareholders-investors should 
carefully manage their relationship with managers depending on the venture age as well as 
institutional dynamics. 
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Appendix – Data collection strategy 
Due to the sensitive nature of the VC industry, only very few researchers have so far been able to 
analyze contracting practices with hand-collected cross-country samples (for notable exceptions 
see Cumming, 2008; and Cumming and Johan, 2008) or with a dataset of similar richness (Bienz 
and Walz, 2010; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004; Kaplan, Martel and 
Stromberg, 2007; Lerner and Schoar, 2005). Despite the dataset’s advantages discussed in the 
main text, it may raise concerns of generalizability, which can be addressed by comparing the 
sample with those used in similar studies. In relation to the ventures’ development, this sample is 
similar to Podolny (2001) and Bellavitis, Filatotchev and Kamuriwo (2014). Early-stage 
represents 38% of the sample, comparable to 55% for Podolny and 42% for Bellavitis et al. The 
intermediate stage covers 42% of the sample, while it represents 35% of the sample in Podolny 
(2001) and 29% in Bellavitis et al. (2014). Finally, the later-stage represents 18% of the sample, 
compared to 10% and 22% for Podolny and Bellavitis et al. respectively. Similar proportions can 
be retrieved from Manigart et al. (2006) where the authors show a sample equally split between 
early-stage and late-stage VC investments (the authors report only two stages).  
The degree of syndication is also aligned with other studies. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) 
find that the average syndicate is composed of 3.5 investors, while Bellavitis et al. (2014) report 
3.1 for the average syndicate. The average in this paper is 3.7.  
The data covers a wide range of countries and industries. Within Europe, Germany has 
the highest number of investments (81), followed by the UK (34), Scandinavia (30), and France 
(19). The remaining investments belong to other countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Switzerland and Austria. Another 65 investments are from the U.S. (24.5% of the total) and 24 
(9.1%) are from Israel. Contracts are from a range of different industries and are distributed 
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evenly over time. Major industries such as IT/software, semiconductors and communication are 
grouped under ‘ICT’ (7 . %), while biotech and medical technology are grouped under life 
science (24.9%). The remaining 4.9% comprises of firms operating in other industries, such as 
media, food and beverage or traditional industries.  
  Manigart et al. (2006) and Sapienza, Manigart and Vermeir (1996) are among the few 
studies looking at VC country differences. Table 3 compares the various samples. This study 
covers more countries than Manigart et al. (2006) and Sapienza et al. (1996). For purposes of 
comparison, the table reports the proportion of observations including only the countries 
available in the other two studies (e.g. Israel is excluded from the count). The first figure relative 
to this sample proportion reports the share of observations comparable to Manigart et al. (2006), 
while the second figure is comparable to Sapienza et al. (1996). While the values show that our 
sample covers well the geographical VC market distribution, the German market is over-
represented in relative terms (at the expense of smaller markets such as the Netherlands and 
Belgium). Compared to Sapienza et al. (1996), our dataset includes a larger and more 
representative proportion of U.S. deals. Finally, this sample is well distributed in terms of years 
of investment. These differences are marginal and should not significantly endanger the 
generalizability of the results. 
------------ Insert Table 3 about here ------------ 
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Tables and figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and correlations   
  Variables Obs. Mean (S.D.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Early stage (adverse selection) 262 .38 (.48) 
            
2 Later stage (moral hazard) 262 .20 (.40) -.40* 
           
3 US 265 .24 (.43) -.05* .05* 
          
4 Israel 265 .09 (.28) -.11* .01 -.18* 
         
5 Investment per VC 219 2208 (2199) .03 -.02 .02 .05* 
        
6 VC stake 251 59.3 (24.4) -.17* .11* .21* -.11* -.04 
       
7 Life Sciences 265 .24 (.43) .26* -.23* -.21* -.03 .22* -.01 
      
8 DotCom bubble 265 .22 (.41) .17* -.18* -.06* -.05* .18* -.33* -.08* 
     
9 Syndication 265 3.73 (3.12) .05* -.14* .33* -.04 .06* .44* .06* -.10* 
    
10 Cash flow rights 256 .60 (23) -.07* .10* .22* .07* -.02 .32* -.11* -.27* .22* 
   
11 Staged financing 265 .48 (.50) -.22* .08* .03 .01 -.01 .20* .02 -.09* .04 .45* 
  
12 Board rights majority 237 .58 (.49) -.11* .18* .02 -.07 -.06* .62* .04 -.29* .30* .19* .16* 
 
13 Management replacement 250 .09 (.29) -.04 -.10* -.13* .13* .00 -.04* -.03 .11* .01 -.14* .01 -.16* 
 
* p < .05. 
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Table 2 - Contractual and non-contractual mechanisms in VC investment contracts 
Model-Estimator 1-Poisson 2-Poisson 3-Logit 4-Logit 5-Logit 
Dependent variable Syndication Cash flow rights Staged financing 
Board rights 
majority 
Management 
replace 
IV: Agency risks 
     
Early stage (adverse selection) -.07 (.10) .13*(.06) -.97** (.32) -.13 (.46) -.48 (.60) 
Later stage (moral hazard) -.31** (.09) .05 (.06) -.02 (.42) 1.06
+
 (.64) -.60 (.75) 
      
IV: Institutional variables 
   
U.S. .55** (.13) .28** (.08) -.31 (.40) -1.44
+
 (.82) -2.19** (.81) 
Israel .06 (.14) .18** (.07) .34 (.48) .15 (.67) .42 (.95) 
    
Investment per VC .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) 
VC stake .01* (.00) .00
+
 (.00) .02** (.00) .08** (.01) .02
+
 (.01) 
Life sciences .26* (.11) -.12 (.11) .38 (.45) -.25 (.54) -.38 (.72) 
DotCom bubble .22* (.10) -.27* (.12) .56 (.47) -.73 (.59) .59 (.54) 
DV: Agency reduction 
Mechanisms 
     
    Syndication DV .02* (.01) -.01 (.04) .15 (.10) .08 (.11) 
Cash flow rights .12
+
 (.07) DV .11 (.20) -.64* (.32) -.41 (.26) 
Staged financing -.03 (.07) .04 (.06) DV .45 (.37) -.12 (.45) 
Board rights majority .28 (.18) -.17
+
 (.09) .35 (.34) DV -1.72* (.74) 
Management replacement .16 (.18) -.13 (.10) -.30 (.45) -1.91* (.69) DV 
    
Constant .09 (.19) .40** (.12) -1.07 (.89) 3.15** (.82) -2.00* (.88) 
Pseudo/R2 - - .10 .44 .13 
Log pseudolikelihood -416.2 -278.6 -123.4 -74.16 -54.3 
VIF 3.14 2.81 3.33 2.76 3.42 
Wald chi2/F 429.24** 117.39** 74.38** 178.59** 202.48** 
Observations 199 199 199 199 199 
** p<.01; * p<.05; + p<.1      
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Table 3. Observations by country and sample comparison 
Countries/samples Obs. Our sample % Manigart et al. (2006) Sapienza et al. (1996) 
Belgium 1 1% and N.A. 4 % N. A. 
France 19 12% and 15% 25% 19% 
Germany 81 49% and N.A. 30% N. A. 
Sweden 20 12% and N.A. 8% N. A. 
Netherlands 5 3% and 4% 7% 17% 
United Kingdom 37 23% and 29% 26% 34% 
United States 65 N.A. 52% N. A. 30% 
Other countries 37 N. A. N. A. N. A. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model 
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